By Joseph Eyre
An inherent danger in sudden flare-ups of armed confrontation is that they are rarely clear-cut events. Contradictory claims by participants and the ‘fog of war’ often preclude a reasonable attribution of responsibility and even an accurate timeline of events. One such example was the recent skirmish between Indian and Chinese troops in the Galwan Valley in June. As a result of the remote Himalayan location, and with both sides attributing blame to the other and releasing significantly different casualty reports, there was a worrying lack of clarity regarding the biggest and most lethal clash between the nuclear-armed neighbours in over 50 years.
This same lack of clarity is evident in the escalating conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which began on September 27th. Though the two states have a long history of conflict over territorial disputes, this particular instance, over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, has rapidly erupted into large scale conflict. Both sides have now fully mobilised and deployed significant military hardware, including drones, tanks and heavy artillery. Armenian and Azerbaijani sources have released footage appearing to show significant losses inflicted on both sides and civilian casualties have also been reported.
Wider Implications
While a border clash between two post-Soviet states over a long-held territorial dispute may seem relatively inconsequential, the potential implications are enormous. This is primarily because Armenia and Azerbaijan are backed by Russia and Turkey, respectively. Russia and Armenia are both members of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, an organisation similar in function and purpose to NATO, of which Turkey is a member.
President Erdogan has been somewhat vocal in support of Azerbaijan’s claims, referring to Armenia as an “occupying power” on September 28th. But, more significantly, there is also substantial evidence pointing towards Turkish involvement in the conflict. Reports indicate Turkey is sending military experts and fighters from Syria to assist Azerbaijan, along with providing planes and drones. To corroborate these claims, observers noted a substantial increase in the movement of military transport planes between Turkey and Azerbaijan in the days leading up to the 27th September.
Furthermore, on September 29th, the Armenian Ministry of Defence accused Turkey of using an F-16 to shoot down an Armenian SU-25 in Armenian airspace. While Turkey currently denies the accusation, this represents a major escalation and, if true, constitutes a direct attack by a NATO member on a CSTO member.
Prior interventions by Turkey led to the Armenian ambassador to Moscow stating that if Turkish F-16 jets are used in the conflict, Armenia will respond by launching Iskander missiles (a Russian-made short-range ballistic missile) into Azerbaijan. The 500km range of these missiles puts Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, within range. So far, fighting has taken place primarily within the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which is legally the territory of Azerbaijan, but retaliation for such a launch would likely involve Azerbaijan launching a similar attack into Armenia. Whether Armenia will retaliate to the downing of the Su-25 in this way remains to be seen.
However, any attacks on Armenia, including the downing of the jet, could potentially trigger the collective defence element of CSTO, prompting a Russian intervention. Despite the more overt involvement of Turkey and the potential to be dragged in, Putin has been markedly less direct, joining other world leaders in calling for an immediate ceasefire.
How Did We Get Here?
Given the potential for a catastrophic escalation, and the risk of a direct confrontation between a NATO member and CSTO members, it is important to determine the events which led to the current situation. As it stands, both sides have blamed one another for the opening of hostilities. Both the Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs have stated that it was the other who began shelling their positions on September 27th.
Despite contradictory statements assigning blame, currently available evidence points to a pre-planned offensive launched by Azerbaijan, with the support of Turkey, on the morning of September 27th. One element of such evidence is the volume of Turkish military transport flights to Azerbaijan in the days prior to the 27th mentioned above. Another important element is a report by BBC News Russia dated to the 24th September. The report states that Azerbaijan had suddenly called up its reservist forces, ordering them to report for exercises which would last 15 days. This 15 day period was then extended to two months without explanation. Furthermore, the report states that large volumes of civilian pickup trucks were being requisitioned by the police for military use as far back as September 21st.
These factors, along with the rapid pace at which the conflict has escalated, suggest a significant degree of preparation and a large-scale military operation. Azerbaijani Defence Ministry claims to have ‘liberated’ various villages in the region also point to a planned military operation.
Given the lack of concrete evidence and the contradictory claims of participants, it is impossible to say for certain how this conflict came about. However, given the potentially dire consequences of further escalation, it will become increasingly important to pinpoint the origins of the conflict. As it currently stands it appears that Azerbaijan, backed by Turkey, has launched a relatively large-scale military offensive, involving a significant quantity of military hardware, into disputed Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s place in the CSTO significantly increases the possibility of a Russian intervention and the prospect of a proxy war between a NATO member and CSTO members. The risk of miscalculation or accident in such a situation is dangerously high. As recently as 2015 Turkey shot down a Russian Su-24 jet operating over Syria; while both sides managed to deescalate successfully on that occasion, such a situation could easily happen again with a much more serious outcome.
This report was compiled by Joseph Eyre. You can find Joseph on Twitter here.